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4 See Unif. Commercial Code, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Code Has BeenAdopted, 1B  U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 2002). 5 See U .C.C. § 2-102 (defining the scope of Article 2). 6 Statistics on retail and merchant wholesale sales are available from the U.S.Census Bureau. See U.S. Census Bureau, at http://www.census.gov (last updatedNov. 11, 2002). 7 See Speidel, supra note 3, at 790-91. 8 For the full text of these drafts, see Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif.State Laws, Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts, at http:// www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc_frame.htm (last updated Sept. 14, 2002). 9 The 1999 Annual Meeting Draft, for example, sought to rewrite large portionsof Article 2. See id. 10 See Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: TheNever Ending Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. Rev. 1683, 1684 (1999).11 See id . 12 See Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, NCCUSL Accepts Compromise on Scope butRejects Bid To Finalize Art. 2 Changes, 70 U.S.L.W. 2099, 2099-100 (Aug. 21,2001) (describing how the drafting committee has scaled back its ambition forrevising Article 2) [hereinafter NCCUSL Accepts Compromise]. 13 For the press release announcing NCCUSL’s decision, see Nat’l Conferenceof Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Revision to Key Articles of the UniformCommercial Code Completed, at http:// www.nccusl.org/nccusl/pressreleases/pr080502_UCC.asp  (Aug. 5, 2002). For the actual text of the approved amend-ments, see Proposed Amendments to Uniform Commercial Code Article 2--Sales
model law, drafted in the 1950s and enacted in forty-nine states and variousterritories and possessions.4  Because Article 2 governs almost all contractsfor the sale of goods, 5 its revision could affect the legal rules applicable toconsumer and non-consumer transactions worth trillions of dollars eachyear.6 Since the time of NCCUSL’s decision to modernize Article 2, twosuccessive drafting committees have worked ardently on the revisionproject.7  Their labors have produced more than a dozen detailed drafts. 8The initial drafts sought to update nearly all aspects of Article 2.9  Thisapproach, however, proved too controversial. NCCUSL was worried thatsome state legislatures might refuse to enact the contemplated changesbecause of potential opposition from consumer or business groups.10NCCUSL did not want to destroy the present uniformity of Article 2 byadvancing amendments that some jurisdictions might reject. 11Accordingly, several years ago, NCCUSL began scaling back its plansfor revision.12  At long last, on August 5, 2002, it announced its finalapproval of a rather modest set of amendments to Article 2.13  *597 The
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(2002), at http:// www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/annual2002.htm (last visitedNov. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Annual Meeting 2002  Draft]. 14 Commentators generally agreed that more  ambitious changes had littlelikelihood of passing. See Fred H. Miller & W illiam H. Henning, The State of theUniform Commercial Code--2001, SG043 ALI-ABA 1, 8-9 (2001) (discussingArticle 2’s uncertain future, and concluding, “While a number of fixes in amendedArticle 2 would be nice, an amendment effort that goes too far to cover minormatters or takes too regulatory a stance will fail”).15 The ALI is a private organization of lawyers, judges, and law professors.Founded in 1923, the ALI has devoted its energy to improving the law bypublishing restatements of the law and working with NCCUSL on model laws. SeeAmerican Law Institute, About the American Law Institute, at http:// www.ali.org(last visited Sept. 23, 2002). 16 In 2001, the ALI approved a set of revisions, but NCCUSL withheld itsapproval. See NCCUSL Accepts Compromise , supra note 12, at 2099-100. 
proposed revisions facilitate electronic commercial transactions and makeminor corrections and adjustments but otherwise avoid significantsubstantive changes.14 The approved amendments will not become law until they overcometwo hurdles.  First, the American Law Institute (ALI)15 , with whomNCCUSL traditionally has collaborated when drafting and revising theU.C.C., must approve the changes. This approval is highly likely but notcertain because NCCUSL and the ALI have disagreed about Article 2 in thepast.16 Second, and more significantly, state legislatures must enact theamendments.  NCCUSL has an impressive record of persuading states topass its model laws, but it may have some difficulty persuading legislatorsof the need to make the proposed revisions, scaled back as they are.  Evenif all goes well, the process will take years to complete. The decision not to revise Article 2 from top to bottom as originallyplanned raises an important question: how significant is NCCUSL’s failureto achieve what it set out to accomplish when it decided to undertake acomplete modernization of Article 2 in 1991?  In other words, will thecommercial law suffer a great deal, or is the scaling back of the project notso very important? Assessing the need to revise Article 2 is very difficult, if not impossible.Commentators and participants in the revision process have had widely
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17 The decade-long work of the ALI and NCCUSL’s drafting committeesdemonstrate the continuing support of these organizations for the idea of revisingArticle 2, although they have not always agreed on every detail. Prominent industryopposition came from General E lectric and the Software Publishers Association.See Michael Rustad & Lori E. Eisenschmidt, The Commercial Law of InternetSecurity, 10 High Tech. L.J. 213, 274 n.301 (1995). Professor James J. White ledmuch of the academic opposition to Article 2. See Richard E. Speidel, RevisingUCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 Hastings L.J. 607, 617 n.32 (2001)(asserting that Professor White “opposed much of Revised Article 2 in print, on thefloor of the ALI and NCCUSL, and in strategy sessions with strong sellers outsideof the process”). For examples of criticism, see Patricia A. Tauchert, A Survey ofPart 5 of Revised Article 2, 54 SMU L. Rev. 971, 972 (2001) (noting that thestrongest concerns include the app lication of Article 2  to software, the relationshipto the Uniform Electronic T ransactions Act, federal legislation on electroniccontracting, and warranty rights); James J. White, Form Contracts Under RevisedArticle 2, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 315, 322-26 (1997) (criticizing proposed revisionrequiring sellers to d isclose all terms and obtain informed consent on formcontracts); and James J. White, Comments at 1997 AALS Annual Meeting:Consumer Protection and the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 W ash. U. L.Q. 219(1997) (arguing against consumer protection provisions). 18 For general information on electronic commerce, see David Baumer & J.C.Poindexter, Cyberlaw and E-Commerce (2002); Susan Singleton, Ecommerce: APractical Guide to the Law (2001); Barry B. Sookman, Computer, Internet andElectronic Commerce Law (1991 & Supp. 2000); and Benjamin Wright & Jane K.Winn, The Law of Electronic Commerce (3d ed. 2000). 19 See infra Part II. 
different opinions.17  This Article, accordingly, does not *598 argue eitherfor or against revision. Instead, it has a more limited goal. It strives todemonstrate only that events of the past decade have made changing thelaw increasingly less important. In other words, it seeks to show that,however urgent the need to modernize Article 2 was in 1990, this needironically has waned with the passage of time. Article 2 requires lesschange now than it did a decade ago to meet the requirements of moderncommerce. This Article supports this claim by looking at three very significantdevelopments that have occurred since 1990.  The first is the emergence of“electronic commerce”--the buying and selling of goods in transactionsformed using computers.18  The widespread introduction of a new way ofcreating contracts for the sale of goods, at first blush, might seem toincrease the need for revising Article 2. Yet, as explained more fully below,19 the recent growth of electronic commerce actually tends to diminish theimportance of Article 2’s present contract formation rules because it
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20 See infra Part II. 21 See infra text accompanying notes 156-57. 22 See U nif. Computer Info. Transactions Act, 7 U.L.A. 11 (Supp. 2002). 23 See infra Part III. 24 See infra Part III. 25 See 1  William D. Hawkland et al., Uniform Commercial Code Series §1-102:3 (1998) (describing common law history). 
removes many sales transactions from the coverage of those rules.Moreover, although electronic commerce raises new legal issues, the statesand federal government already have enacted separate legislation to dealwith them.20 The second development relates to an important decision that NCCUSLmade regarding the scope of Article 2.  In particular, when NCCUSL beganthe revision process, it wanted to make Article 2 govern all aspects ofcontracts for the sale of computer software.21  During the past ten years,however, NCCUSL has changed its mind. It *599 now has chosen to dealwith the sale of computer information through a separate body of law, theUniform Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA).22  AlthoughUCITA has obtained only minimal legislative approval and remains highlycontroversial,23  the decision to treat the subject of computer software salesoutside of Article 2 lessens the importance of revising Article 2 for reasonsexplained below. The third development is that a decade of precedent has accumulatedsince NCCUSL decided to revise Article 2 in 1991.  The numerous newcases have significance because NCCUSL wanted to revise Article 2 inlarge part to resolve unsettled issues that had arisen under its current text.24The numerous decisions interpreting Article 2 during the past decade havegone a long way in settling many of these questions. Article 2, accordingly,has become more certain and less in need of revision with the passage oftime. The remainder of this Article consists of five parts.  Part I describesArticle 2 and the lengthy attempt to revise it.  Parts II, III, and IV thenaddress the three developments that have lessened the need for rewritingArticle 2.  A brief conclusion follows. I. Article 2 and the Revision Process A. Creation of the Original Article 2 The common law governed contracts for the sale of goods for most ofthis nation’s history.25  In 1906, however, this tradition began to end. In that
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26 See U nif. Sales Act, 1 U.L.A. 1  (1950). 27 See 1  Hawkland et al., supra note 25, § 1-103:3  n.1. 28 See id . 29 See id . 30 See James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 1,at 3 (3d ed. 1988) (describing U.C.C. history). 31 See id . at 4. 32 See Speidel, supra note 3, at 788. 33 See U .C.C. § 2-102 (2002). 34 Id. §§  2-105, 107. 35 See id. § 2-104(1) (defining the term merchant); id. § 2-104 cmt. 2 (discussingthe fourteen merchant rules in Article 2). 36 See, e .g., Fairfax Leary, Jr. & David Frisch, Is Revision Due for Article 2?,31 V ill. L. Rev. 399 (1986). 
year, NCCUSL promulgated the “Uniform Sales Act,”26  a model state lawseeking to codify important sales rules.27  Drafted by Professor SamuelWilliston, the Uniform Sales Act quickly received widespread approval.28Eventually, the legislatures of more than two-thirds of the states enactedit.29 In the 1940s, inspired by the success of the Uniform Sales Act and otheruniform state laws, NCCUSL and the ALI decided to create *600 whateventually became the U.C.C.30  The U.C.C. is a massive model law thatgoverns a variety of commercial topics, including sales. As part of theU.C.C. drafting project, NCCUSL and the ALI chose to replace theUniform Sales Act with what is now Article 2. NCCUSL and the ALIpublished the first official draft of U.C.C. Article 2 in 1951.31  The last setof major amendments to Article 2 took place in 1958.32 Article 2 has breathtaking scope.  The article governs transactions in“goods,”33  which it defines to include all things which are movable plusseveral other types of things.34  It covers contracts made by both merchantsand non-merchants, although it contains some special rules applicable onlyto merchants.35 Every year, Article 2 governs innumerable sales, rangingfrom small transactions at vending machines and grocery stores to sales ofextraordinarily expensive equipment like aircraft and supercomputers. B. The Ongoing Effort To Revise Article 2 Academic writers began questioning whether the ALI and NCCUSLshould modernize Article 2 in the mid-1980s.36  In 1986, their scholarshipcame to the attention of Professor Geoffrey Hazard, who was serving as thechair of the Uniform Commercial Code’s Permanent Editorial Board
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37 The Permanent Editorial Board of the U.C.C. is a committee with twelvemembers. It monitors the U.C.C., seeking to discourage non-uniform amendmentsor interpretations and to detect needs for modernization. See Peter Winship, LawMaking and Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 Ala. L. Rev. 673, 677n.17 (1990) (describing the composition of the PEB and its functions in 1986). 38 See Speidel, supra note 3, at 788-89. 39 See id . 40 See id . at 789 . 41 See id . 42 See ABA Task Force, An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990, Preliminary Reportof the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Study Group, 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 981,986-98 (1991). 43 See PEB Study Group, Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2  ExecutiveSummary, 46 Bus. Law. 1869 (1991). 44 See Speidel, supra note 3, at 789. 45 See id . 46 See Rusch, supra note 10, at 1683 n.*. 47 See Speidel, supra note 3, at 789-90. 
(PEB)37  and the Director of the ALI.38  In these capacities, ProfessorHazard asked Professors Charles Mooney and Richard Speidel to preparea memorandum on whether Article 2 of the U.C.C. required revision.39 *601 Professors Speidel and Mooney completed this memorandum in1987, expressing the view that Article 2 needed various changes.40  Inresponse to their memorandum, the PEB appointed a Study Group toconsider the matter further, and named Professor Speidel to chair this StudyGroup.41  In the fall of 1990, the PEB Study Group prepared a “preliminaryreport” on the subject.42  Then, in the spring of 1991, the Study Groupcompleted a more focused report, which it called an “executivesummary.”43  These documents, discussed more fully below, expressed theview that Article 2 needed revision. In the fall of 1991, based on the recommendation of the PEB StudyGroup, NCCUSL appointed a drafting committee to prepare a proposedrevision.44  It selected Professor Speidel to serve as the Chief Reporter. 45Later, it appointed Professor Linda Rusch to serve as the AssociateReporter.46  The Article 2 drafting committee produced its first draft of therevised article in 1994 and then produced subsequent drafts every yearthrough 1999.47 The committee’s July 1995 draft marked a turning point in the revisionproject.  In that draft, the committee made an important choice whendeciding how to address contracts for computer software.  In particular, the
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48 Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform CommercialCode Article 2B: Dec. 12, 1996 Draft, at 7, available at http:// www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/uccart1.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2002). 49 See id . 50 See Speidel, supra note 3, at 790 n.13. 51 See Revised U.C.C. Sales Provisions Considered, Electronic CommcerceIssues Still Troubling, 68 U.S.L.W. 2714, 2714 (May 30, 2000) (describing thefinal draft history). 52 See Speidel, supra note 17, at 611 & n.15. 53 See id . at 611  & n.17. 54 See Speidel, supra note 3, at 790. 55 See Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, NCCUSL Commit-tees/Members, at http://www.nccusl.org (last updated June 18, 2002). ProfessorGabriel served as a member of the original drafting committee. See Speidel, supranote 17, at 612 n.18. 56 See Annual Meeting 2002  Draft, supra note 13. 57 See id . 
drafters proposed to turn Article 2 into a general “hub” that would containprovisions important for both the sale of goods and the licensing ofsoftware, and then to create an Article 2B as a “spoke” that would containspecial provisions for computer software.48 The “hub and spoke” experiment lasted only about a year. In 1996, thecommittee produced a revised draft that abandoned the approach.49  It madethis decision because NCCUSL chose to handle licensing of computerinformation in a separate uniform law that *602 eventually became knownas the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA).50 In May 1999, the ALI approved a proposed final draft.51  At the ALImeeting, the Executive Director and President of NCCUSL supported theproposal.52  NCCUSL, however, later decided not to vote on the draftbecause it feared that the draft would not win support of all the statelegislatures.53  At this point, Professors Speidel and Rusch resigned fromthe drafting committee in protest.54 NCCUSL then appointed a new drafting committee.  The currentreporter is Professor Henry Deeb Gabriel. 55 This new committee workedon the project with diligence and obtained NCCUSL’s final approval for adraft in August 2002. As noted above, this draft greatly has scaled back thedrafting goals.56  Instead of completely revising Article 2, the committeehas sought only to amend a few provisions.57  It has decided to add
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58 See id . 59 See Speidel, supra note 3, at 791-93. 60 See id . at 791 . 61 See id . 62 See id . at 791-92. 63 See id . 64 See id . at 792 . 65 See id . 66 See id . 
provisions on electronic commerce and rewrite a few troublesomeprovisions, while leaving most of the article intact.58 As of the time of this writing, the future of even these less ambitiouschanges remains in doubt.  The ALI must approve them, and no one knowsfor sure how state legislatures will react.  It is likely, however, that theywill become law in the next few years. C. The Difficulties of Revision Professor Speidel has offered a convincing explanation for why theNCCUSL and ALI have taken so long in approving a final revision ofArticle 2.59  He does not lay the blame at the feet of any one person ororganization. Instead, he identifies five factors that each have madechanging the current law difficult. *603 First, Professor Speidel points out that, from the outset, noimportant group of commercial buyers or sellers was demanding a revisionof Article 2.60  Most businesses felt content with the status quo and viewedevery proposed change with skepticism.61  The drafters thus faced an uphillbattle from the start. Second, Professor Speidel believes the effort to draft a “hub and spoke”version of Article 2 had lingering negative effects even after its abandon-ment.62  When the drafters attempted to turn Article 2 into the “hub,” theyrenumbered and rewrote many of its provisions.63  The 1999 draft continuedto reflect many of these changes, giving Article 2 an unfamiliar visage thattroubled opponents of the revision.64 Third, Professor Speidel observes that removing the subject of computerinformation licenses from the scope of the revision did not eliminatecontroversy about them.65  Although NCCUSL decided to deal withlicenses in UCITA, questions about the interaction between UCITA andArticle 2 remain.66  Any proposed revision of Article 2 must address thesechanges. 
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67 See id . 68 See id . 69 See id. On the merits, Professor Speidel strongly disputes the claim that thedrafting committee exalted the rights of consumers over the rights of sellers. SeeSpeidel, supra note 17, at 614-16. 70 See Speidel, supra note 3, at 792. 71 See id . 72 See id . 73 See id . 74 See N at’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Introductions &A d o p t i o n s  o f  U ni fo r m  A ct s:  U C C  A r t ic l e  4 A ,  a t  h t t p : / /www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucca4a .asp (lastvisited Nov. 6, 2002) (showing widespread adoption of these recently revisedarticles); Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Introductions &Adoptions of Uniform Acts: UCC Article 5, at http :// www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucca5.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (same).
Fourth, Professor Speidel notes that the Article 2 drafting committee raninto great difficulty in addressing consumer protection issues.67  In hisview, the committee never could provide sufficient measures to satisfy thedesires of consumer groups.68  Yet, at the same time, commercial interestsfound excessive even the limited consumer protection provisions underconsideration.69 Fifth, Professor Speidel explains that the entire process became verypolitical.70  Commercial interests persuaded NCCUSL that they wouldlobby state legislatures against adopting the revision if they did not getwhat they wanted.71  NCCUSL took these warnings seriously because it didnot want to propose legislation that would not enjoy *604 universaladoption.72  The ALI, however, felt more reluctant to change its viewsbased on commercial interests.73 Professor Speidel’s analysis is persuasive.  In fact, to bolster hisposition, he might have compared the Article 2 revision process to therecent drafting efforts that produced Article 4A on funds transfers andrevised Article 5 on letters of credit.  The ALI and NCCUSL had littledifficulty approving these revisions, and they sailed through the statelegislatures. 74 The committees working on Articles 4A and 5 did not face any of thefactors that Professor Speidel believes impeded the revision of Article 2.Commercial interests strongly favored the creation of Article 4A because
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75 See U.C.C. art. 4A prefatory note (1994) (explaining that Article 4A wasneeded because there was “no comprehensive body of law that defines the rightsand obligations that arise from wire transfers”). 76 See id. art. 5 prefatory note (explaining how “the customs and practices forletter of credit” have changed in the past fifty years, requiring a revision of Article5). 77 See id. §§ 2-201 to -210 (2002) (stating rules concerning the “Form,Formation and Readjustment of Contract”). 
no legislation comprehensively addressed funds transfers,75  and theyfavored revising Article 5 because it did not reflect the realities of modernletter of credit usage.76  Consumer groups, moreover, did not oppose thesearticles because funds transfers and letters of credit have little impact onconsumers. In addition, neither Article 4A nor Article 5 suffered from thedifficulties similar to those that arose from the aborted “hub and spoke”draft revision of Article 2. In any event, the effort to revise Article 2 has not yet achieved success.As noted above, the final draft approved in August 2002 did not includevery many significant changes.  The question therefore remains whether theneed to revise Article 2 has increased or decreased during the past tenyears.  If the need has grown, then the failure of the revision process toaccomplish more of NCCUSL’s original goals is more serious than if theneed has diminished. *605 II. The Emergence of Electronic Commerce Article 2 contains a number of rules regarding the formation of contractsfor the sale of goods.77 Accordingly, in deciding whether the need to reviseArticle 2 has increased or decreased during the past decade, one importantquestion is whether the methods of forming contracts to buy and sell goodshave changed. The answer to this question is decidedly yes. In fact, of allthe changes that have occurred in sales of goods in the past ten years, themethods of forming sales contracts have seen the most innovation. Although people still mostly use traditional methods to buy and sellgoods, a significant amount of electronic commerce has emerged.  The term“electronic commerce” refers to contracts made by means of computers or
WANING IMPO RTAN CE O F REVISIONS TO U.C.C. ARTICLE 212
78 The term “electronic commerce” (or sometimes “e-commerce”) refers to“transactions conducted over the Internet, either by consumers purchasing goodsand services, or directly between businesses.” M icrosoft Encarta World EnglishDictionary, at http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/Dictionary/DictionaryHome-.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2002). 
other electronic devices.78  It typically includes transactions conducted overthe Internet, either at vendors’ websites or through email. At first blush, the growth of electronic commerce might seem tonecessitate substantial changes to Article 2.  After all, Article 2 came intobeing in the 1950s before anyone contemplated electronic transactions.Article 2, therefore, unsurprisingly contains no provisions specificallydesigned to deal with them. The reality, however, differs for two reasons.  First, because theprovisions in Article 2 concerning the formation of contracts have little tosay about electronic commerce, the growth of electronic commerce hasmade them less important.  Second, to the extent that electronic commerceraises new legal issues, legislation outside of the U.C.C. already hasaddressed most of them.  The following discussion elaborates these points.A. How Parts of Article 2 Are Becoming Less Relevant To observe how electronic commerce is making parts of Article 2 lessrelevant, consider the following example.  Suppose that a law school isrunning short on supplies.  It wants to purchase a hundred boxes of pens,markers, and chalk.  It knows an office supply company that might havethese items.  Consider how the law school would go about purchasing theitems. *606 In 1960, 1970, or 1980, if a buyer like the law school wanted topurchase a bulk order of goods, it might call a seller on the telephone. Theseller might provide a price quote, a description of the goods, and astatement of the terms on which the seller wished to sell them. The buyerthen would fill out one of the buyer’s purchase order forms and mail it tothe seller. The seller would send back an acknowledgment and, at the sametime or a little while later, would ship the goods. This routine once pervaded the economy.  You can imagine the lawschool and the office supply company taking these actions, not just once,but hundreds of times over the past decades.  Similarly, many thousands ofother businesses and institutions were buying and selling goods in thismanner every day. 
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79 See U.C.C. §§ 2-201 to -210 (stating rules concerning the “Form, Formationand Readjustment of Contract”). 80 See id . § 2-206(1)(b). The U.C.C. states, Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circum-stances... an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or currentshipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a promptpromise to ship or by the prompt or current shipment of conforming ornon-conforming goods, but such a shipment of non-conforming goods doesnot constitute an acceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the buyer thatthe shipment is offered only as an accommodation to the  buyer. Id.; see also  Harper Trucks, Inc. v. Allied Welding Supply, Inc., 2  U.C .C. Rep.Serv. 2d (CBC) 835 (D. Kan. 1986). 
In 1990, the transaction probably would follow the same pattern, withone possible change resulting from a technological advance that becameubiquitous in the 1980s.  In particular, the law school probably would faxits purchase order to the office supply company rather than mail it.  Theoffice supply company might then return a confirmation by fax, as well.Very little else would change.  The terms of the forms exchanged probablywould remain the same. When the ALI and NCCUSL were drafting the U.C.C. in the late 1940sand early 1950s, they recognized that this simple but seemingly timelesstype of transaction occurred thousands of times a day.  They also realizedthat it could be important to determine whether parties had created acontract and, if they did, what the terms of the contract might be.Accordingly, they included in part 2 of Article 2 a number of very detailedrules to address issues that might arise when contracts for the sale of goodsare formed in this manner. 79 Section 2-206(1)(b), for instance, makes clear that a buyer’s purchaseorder will be construed as an offer to buy goods, unless it says otherwise.80  This rule saves parties (and later the courts) the *607 trouble ofscrutinizing the possibly ambiguous or pithy language of a purchase orderto determine whether it constitutes an offer or merely preliminary
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81 See 1  William D. Hawkland et al., Uniform Commercial Code Series §2-206:2 (2002). The common law of contracts generally requires courts todetermine whether the offeror “manifest[ed]... a willingness to enter into a bargain,so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargainis invited and will conclude it.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24 (1981).Outside of the law of sales, this process often is ambiguous. See, e.g., Owen v.Tunison, 158 A. 926 (Me. 1932) (holding that the defendant’s letter was a generalinvitation to negotiate and not an offer to  sell property). 82 See U .C.C. § 2-206(1)(b). 83 See id . 84 Professor H awkland explains, Under the pre-Code law, if the offeror, usually the buyer, specified shipmentof goods as the mode of acceptance, he would have no remedy if non-conforming goods were shipped by the offeree (seller), because the offereecould argue either (a) that the goods shipped did conform to the contract andtherefore did not breach it, or (b) that the goods did not conform to thecontract, and therefore their shipment did not constitute an acceptance,because acceptance of an offer to  enter into  a unilateral contract isaccomplished only if the offeree does the act requested by the offeror (here,by shipment of conforming goods). 1 Hawkland et al., supra note 81, § 2-206:3. 85 See U .C.C. § 2-206(1)(b). 
negotiations.81  The seller knows that it can accept the purchase order andform a contract. Section 2-206(1)(b) not only specifies that purchase orders are offers,but also indicates two ways that the seller may accept them.  One way theseller can accept is simply to ship the goods.82  Indeed, as an example oftheir foresight, the drafters of the U.C.C. even thought to say in section2-206(1)(b) that a shipment of non-conforming goods would constitute anacceptance.83  That way, if the goods turned out to be defective, the sellercould not escape liability by claiming not to have accepted the contract.84Another way to accept is for the seller to promise to ship the goods,such as by sending or faxing back a confirmation.85  If the seller choosesthis method, however, another issue may arise. If the buyer drafted itspurchase form, and the seller drafted its confirmation, the two may containdiscrepancies in their terms. A question may arise whether the differencesin the forms prevent formation of a contract. Under the common law mirror-image rule, a purported acceptance thatdiffers from the offer in any way constitutes an implied rejection*608 and
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86 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 59 (“A reply to an offer whichpurports to accept it but is conditional on the offeror’s assent to terms additional toor different from those offered is not an acceptance but is a counter-offer.”). 87 Note, Offeree’s Response M aterially Altering an Offer Solely to O fferor’sDisadvantage Is an Acceptance Conditional on Offeror’s Assent to the AdditionalTerms Under Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev.132 , 133 (1962). 88 See id . 89 See U .C.C. § 2-207(1). The U.C.C. states, A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirma-tion which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance eventhough it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreedupon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to theadditional or different terms. Id. The U.C.C. further states, Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract issufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the partiesdo not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particularcontract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree,together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any otherprovisions of this Act. Id. § 2-207(3). 90 See id . § 2-207(1). 91 See id . § 2-207(2). The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to thecontract.  Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
a counter-offer.86  This rule ensures that parties are not bound to terms towhich they do not assent. But the mirror-image rule also has drawbacks. Ifthe parties do not pay careful attention to the forms, they may think thatthey have a contract, only to discover later that minor differences haveprevented the contract’s formation.87  Either party then can back out of thetransaction without liability for breach, despite potential harm to the otherparty.88 The drafters of the U.C.C. sought to address this problem by creatingexceptions to the mirror-image rule.  Under section 2-207(1),89  a contractmay be formed even if the purported acceptance contains additional ordifferent terms, unless the acceptance specifically requires the offeror toassent to these terms. 90 If the parties formed a contract despite differencesbetween the offer and acceptance, section 2-207(2) specifies the legal effectof any additional terms contained in a purported acceptance.91 
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(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) theymaterially alter it; or (c) notification of objection to them has already beengiven or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.Id. For discussion of the problem of different terms, see infra notes 197-200 andaccompanying text. 92 See U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (“Conduct by both parties which recognizes theexistence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although thewritings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract.”). 93 See, e .g., Luria Bros. & Co. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron & Metal, Inc., 600 F.2d103  (7th Cir. 1979). 94 See U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (“In such case the terms of the particular contractconsist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with anysupplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.”); DresserIndus. v. Gradall Co., 965 F .2d 1442  (7th Cir. 1992) (applying this provision). 95 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33(1) (1981) (“Even though amanifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot beaccepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonablycertain.”). 96 See U .C.C. § 2-204(3) (“Even though one or more terms are left open acontract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to makea contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriateremedy.”). 
*609 Even if the exception in section 2-207(1) does not apply,formation may occur under the first sentence of section 2-207(3) as a resultof conduct recognizing the existence of a contract.92  For example, theseller could ship the goods and the buyer could accept and pay for them,notwithstanding a statement in the acceptance requiring the offeror toaccept additional terms.93  In this case, the second sentence of section2-207(3) would specify that the terms of a contract include any terms uponwhich the two forms agree.94 A contract formed, either by the forms exchanged or by conduct, mightraise another issue that the drafters of the U.C.C. carefully addressed.  Inparticular, the contract might leave unstated important issues like the timeof delivery or the price of the goods.  This possibility is especially likely ifthe contract was formed by conduct under section 2-703(3) where the formsdid not agree.  The absence of clear terms on these topics could present aproblem at common law because the contract might not be sufficientlydefinite to enforce.95 Yet again, the drafters of the U.C.C. had the foresight to address thisdifficulty.  Section 2-204(3) adopts a more permissive standard than thecommon law traditionally did with respect to indefiniteness.96  The section
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97 See id . 98 See U .C.C. § 2-202. T hat section provides, Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the pa rtiesagree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties asa final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as areincluded therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreementor of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supple-mented (a) by course  of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or bycourse of performance (Section 2-208); and (b) by evidence of consistentadditional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended alsoas a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. Id. 99 See id . § 2-201(1).  Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goodsfor the price of $500 or more is not enforceab le by way of action or defenseunless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale hasbeen made between the parties and signed by the party against whomenforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. Id. 
says that a contract does not fail for indefiniteness so long as the evidenceshows that the parties had an agreement and a reasonably certain basisexists for granting an appropriate remedy.97 The analysis of this kind of typical transaction under Article 2, however,would not necessarily end at this point.  On the contrary, questions aboutthe terms of the agreement also might arise because of the buyer andseller’s telephone conversation prior to the shipment.  The law school oroffice supply store might allege that they had *610 formed an oralagreement regarding the terms of the contract, and that for some reason thepurchase order and the confirmation do not reflect this oral agreement. Thedrafters of the U.C.C. included the parol evidence rule in section 2-202 tospecify the extent to which the contract might include the unwritten terms.98Finally, the promises to buy and sell the goods would be enforceableonly if the parties satisfied the requirements of the statute of frauds insection 2-201(1).99  This provision generally requires promises to buy orsell goods for a price of $500 or more to be evidenced by a signed
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100 See id . 101 See id . §§ 2-201(2)-(3) (stating exceptions to the statute of frauds). 102 See id. § 2-201(3)(c) (“A contract which does not satisfy the requirements ofsubsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceab le... (c) with respectto goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have beenreceived and accepted  (Sec. 2-606).”). 103 See Staples, at http://www.staples.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2002); OfficeDepot, at http://www.officedepot.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2002). 104 Statistics on retail e-commerce sales are available from the U.S. CensusBureau. See U.S. Census Bureau, at http://www.census.gov (last updated Nov. 22,2002). 105 See Online Shoppers Spent $220 Million Monday in Holiday Sales Spike,Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 2001, at J1. 
writing.100  The section, however, contains several exceptions.101  Forexample, the receipt of the goods or the payment could satisfy it.102 This illustration shows something significant about the importance ofthe formation provisions in Article 2.  From the 1960s to the 1990s, all ofthe different sections discussed were needed to provide definite answers tobasic questions about whether a typical business transaction formed acontract and what the terms of the contract might be.  The existence ofArticle 2’s formation provisions during these decades would seem anabsolute necessity. But now move ahead to the present.  Law schools and other businessesstill purchase goods, but there is a new way of doing it.  Instead *611 ofbuying supplies with a written purchase order, the law school more likelythan not would use a computer to gain access to the Internet website of itsoffice supply company. The two leading office supply store chains in theUnited States, Staples and Office Depot, offer all of their products onlineand encourage corporate customers to purchase in this manner.103 The website would provide a complete description of the goods.  Thelaw school user simply would click on the items sought, receive animmediate confirmation (perhaps both on the screen and by email), and theseller would ship the goods shortly afterward.  This process has becomequite common.  Despite the economic downturn and the failure of manyInternet companies, aggregate Internet sales continue to grow.104  At thebusiest times of the year, total online sales may reach $220 million in asingle day.105 What do Article 2’s formation provisions say about the formation ofcontracts for the sale of goods over the Internet?  The reality is not very
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106 See U .C.C. § 2-206(1)(b). 107 See id . 108 See id . §§ 2-207(1), (3). 109 See id . §§ 2-207(2)-(3). 110 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. 111 See U .C.C. § 2-204(3). 
much at all.  As described above, the formation provisions in Article 2 weredesigned to handle contracts formed in the traditional manner of exchang-ing phone calls and written purchase orders and confirmations.  For themost part, these specialized rules have no application in the context ofelectronic commerce. Consider, for instance, each of the provisions described at length above.Section 2-206(1)(b), on the characterization of purchase orders as offers,106does not apply to the typical online sale. No need arises to characterize apurchase order sent by the buyer as an offer because an Internet buyer doesnot send a purchase order. Instead, the buyer indicates assent to a salemerely by clicking on a button on the seller’s website. Likewise, becausethe buyer does not send a purchase order, the Internet seller does not accepta purchase order. Accordingly, section 2-206(1)(b)’s rules on whatconstitutes a proper acceptance of the purchase order107 are similarlyirrelevant. In a typical online transaction, no battle of conflicting forms occurs.Again, the Internet buyer does not send a form to the seller, but insteadmerely clicks a website button.  Accordingly, section 2-207(1) and (3) onthe formation of contracts involving different forms have *612 norelevance.108  Morever, because these provisions do not apply, section2-207(2) and section 2-207(3)’s second sentence, which concern the termsthat such a contract might have, also do not apply.109 In most situations the requirement of definiteness also would not comeinto question.  As noted above, indefiniteness most often becomes aproblem when parties form contracts by conduct when their forms do notagree.110  In online transactions, the parties do not exchange conf lictingforms, and therefore do not create contracts by their conduct. Little doubtarises over the terms of their agreement because the seller’s websitetypically spells them out. For this reason, section 2-204(3)’s relaxing of therequirement of definiteness has little consequence for online sales.111 
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112 See id . § 2-204(1). 113 Id. 114 1 Hawkland et al., supra note 81, § 2-204:1. 115 See Miller & Henning, supra note 14, at 8 (observing that these laws havereduced the urgency of revising Article 2). 
The parol evidence rule in section 2-202 also has no application totypical Internet transactions.  The law school would not call or otherwisecommunicate with the office supply company to gather information aboutthe sale.  Instead, the law school would browse the seller’s website, learnthe details, and then just click a box indicating a desire to purchase thegoods.  The parties, accordingly, would not reach any prior understandingsor agreements that the parol evidence rule might affect. In fact, if a court had to answer the question of whether the law schooland the supplier had a contract, it would need to look at only one provisionof the U.C.C., namely, section 2-204(1).112  This section says a “contract forsale of goods may be formed in any manner sufficient to showagreement.”113  This really is not saying much; as one of the leading U.C.C.commentators has remarked, “The rule is a fairly obvious one, becausethere has never been any doubt that contracts of sale can be made in amanner other than a writing.” 114 The terms of the contract formed over theInternet would be those stated in the website because the buyer does notindicate anything to the contrary. This simple example illustrates how the development of electroniccommerce in many ways makes Article 2 less relevant.  A large number ofhighly specialized Article 2 provisions that have governed innumerablesales for over four decades do not apply to sales made using the newmethod.  Accordingly, to the extent that electronic commerce replacesordinary commerce, the provisions of Article 2 are *613 becoming lessrelevant. The need for revising them thus diminishes because they affect adecreasing amount of commerce. B. New Issues Raised by Electronic Commerce Even if electronic commerce has made existing Article 2 rules lessimportant, a separate question is whether electronic commerce raises anynew legal issues that Article 2 must address.  The answer to this question,as the following discussion will show, is no.  Although electronic com-merce does give rise to several very important new issues, new federal andstate statutes already handle these issues satisfactorily.115 1. Statute of Frauds 
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116 See U .C.C. § 2-201(1). 117 The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws draftedand published UETA. For information and state adoption statistics, see Nat’lConference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, A Few Facts About the UniformElectronic Transaction Act, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ueta.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2002). The full text ofUETA is available at http:// www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.htm(last visited Nov. 6, 2002). 118 15 U .S.C. §§ 7000-7013  (2000). 119 Only one reported case has addressed either UETA or ESIGN as ofNovember 25, 2002. See Specht v. Netscape Communs. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 26n.11 (2d Cir. 2002). 
Section 2-201(1) says that contracts for the sale of goods for a price of$500 or more generally must be evidenced by a signed writing to beenforceable. 116  Electronic commerce raises two important questions aboutthis very important Article 2 provision. First, if a buyer and seller enter acontract by making electronic communications over the Internet, do theirelectronic communications constitute a “writing” within the meaning ofsection 2-201(1)? Second, even if their communication qualifies as awriting, how can the parties sign this writing? Article 2 at present does not answer either of these questions.  Twostatutes outside the U.C.C., however, already address them: the UniformElectronic Transaction Act of 1999 (UETA), a model state law enacted inforty-one states,117  and the federal Electronic Signatures in Global andNational Commerce Act of 2000 (ESIGN).118  Both statutes createexceptions to statutes of frauds so that they do not prevent enforcement ofelectronically formed contracts.119 *614 UETA, the state legislation, eliminates obstacles to electroniccommerce that section 2-201(1) (and other statutes of frauds) might imposeby establishing the following four rules: (a) A record or signature may not be denied legal effect orenforceability solely because it is in electronic form.(b) A contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceabilitysolely because an electronic record was used in its formation. (c) If a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic recordsatisfies the law. 
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120 UETA § 7 (1999), available at http:// www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002). 121 UETA defines a record as “information that is inscribed on a tangiblemedium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable inperceivable form.” Id. § 2(13). It defines an electronic record as “a record created,generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.” Id. § 2(7).122 15 U .S.C. §  7001(a)(1). 123 Although ESIGN  is a federal statute, it does not preempt UETA. See PatriciaBrumfield Fry, A Preliminary Analysis of Federal and State Electronic CommerceL a w s ,  a thttp://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_articles/uniformacts-article-ueta.asp (lastvisited Sept. 29, 2002) (providing an in-depth analysis of the ESIGN ’s preemptiveeffects). On the contrary, ESIGN specifically provides that, if a state has enactedUETA, then UETA rather than ESIGN will govern excep tions to state statutes offrauds. See 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(1). Although the similarity of the statutes generallymakes it irrelevant which law applies, a number of subtle difference do exist. SeeFry, supra, § 2 .B. (d iscussing these differences). 124 NCCUSL expressed the intent to replicate UETA’s provisions in Article 2in a prefatory note that accompanied the Annual Meeting 2001 Draft. SeeAmendments to Uniform Commercial Code Article 2--Sales, prefatory note (2001),at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/ucc0612.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002)[hereinafter Annual Meeting 2001  Draft] (indicating that, consistent with UETAand ESIGN, all references to “writing” are being changed to “record” and that theterms “record” and “sign” will be defined to permit electronic records andsignatures). The Annual Mee ting 2002 Draft, to which NCCUSL gave its finalapproval in August 2002, replicates the relevant provisions but does not contain aprefatory note. See Annual Meeting 2002  Draft, supra note 13. 
(d) If a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfiesthe law. 120 Pursuant to these principles, electronic records and signatures may take theplace of traditional paper and ink under section 2-201(1).121 ESIGN, the federal legislation, accomplishes the same result.  ESIGNsays that, notwithstanding any previously existing statute of frauds, “asignature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not bedenied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is inelectronic form.”122  It thus also allows electronic commerce to take placewithout hindrance from statutes of frauds.123 In light of UETA and ESIGN, Article 2 does not need to be revised toaddress issues raised by the statute of frauds.  Nothing illustrates this pointbetter than NCCUSL’s decision to replicate UETA’s provisions in theAugust 2002 approved amendments to Article 2.124 
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125 UETA § 9(a), availab le at http:// www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002). 126 Id. § 9  cmt. 1. 127 See id . 128 See Annual Meeting 2002 Draft, supra note 13, §  2-212 (copying almostverbatim UETA § 9). 
*615 2. Attribution of Electronic Records A second issue raised by electronic commerce concerns the attributionof electronic records to the persons who made them.  Recalling thehypothetical above, suppose that someone visits an office supply com-pany’s website and purchases office supplies in the name of the law school.The office supply company ships the goods and then demands payment.The law school refuses to pay, insisting that the supplier prove that the lawschool (as opposed to some unknown interloper) actually placed the order.How can the supplier attribute the order to the law school?  What proofis legally sufficient?  These are new and important questions raised byelectronic commerce.  Yet, NCCUSL did not need to revise Article 2 toaddress them.  Again, legislation outside the U.C.C. already supplies theanswers. UETA addresses the issue of attribution with the following provision:[a]n electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to aperson if it was the act of the person.  The act of the person may beshown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of anysecurity procedure applied to determine the person to which theelectronic record or electronic signature was attributable.125Although no cases have yet applied this provision, the UETA commen-tary confirms that an electronic record and electronic signature would beattributable to a person if the “person types his/her name as part of ane-mail purchase order.”126  The commentary also makes clear that theplaintiff would have to overcome any evidence presented by the defendantof fraud or forgery. 127 Because of this provision, Article 2 does not needrevision to address the question of attribution. 128*616 3. Authority and Capacity of Electronic Agents Electronic commerce also raises questions about the authority andcapacity of computers to make contracts.  For example, returning again tothe hypothetical above, suppose that a law school employee visits the
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129 See U .C.C. § 1-103 (1994). 130 UETA § 14(1), available at http:// www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002). UETA further states, (2) A contract may be formed by the interaction of an electronic agent andan individual, acting on the individual’s own behalf or for another person,including by an interaction in which the individual performs actions that theindividual is free to refuse to perform and which the individual knows or hasreason to know will cause the electronic agent to complete the transactionor performance.  (3) The terms of the contract are determined by thesubstantive law applicable to it. Id. §§  14(2)-(3). 131 15 U .S.C. §  7001(h) (2000). The Code provides, A contract or other record relating to a transaction in or affecting interstateor foreign commerce may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforce-ability solely because its formation, creation, or delivery involved the actionof one or more electronic agents so long as the action of any such electronicagent is legally attributable to  the person to  be bound . Id. 132 See U ETA § 14 cmt. 1, available at http:// www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002). 
supply company’s website and makes a purchase.  A computer processesthe sale for the supply company and sends a confirmation without anyhuman intervention.  Could the office supply company later argue that itscomputer lacked either authority or capacity to bind it to a contract? Article 2 does not need revision to answer this question.  The U.C.C.generally has left questions of agency and capacity to non-U.C.C. law. 129Here again, state legislatures and the federal government already havestepped in with alternative legislation. UETA and ESIGN each containprovisions designed to remove any doubt that electronic agents may formcontracts. UETA says, “A contract may be formed by the interaction ofelectronic agents of the parties, even if no individual was aware of orreviewed the electronic agents’ actions or the resulting terms and agree-ments.”130  ESIGN contains a similar provision.131 These provisions in UETA and ESIGN do not, in fact, purport to changeexisting law.  Instead, as the UETA commentary asserts, they merelyconfirm that machines may act as agents.132  No cases have yet *617
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133 See Annual Meeting 2002 Draft, supra note 13, § 2-204(4) (copying almostverbatim UETA § 14). 134 See Graeme Browning, Software Hardball, 24 Nat’l J. 2062, 2062 (1992)(explaining how software was bundled with the first simple computers sold in the1950s). 135 See Elizabeth MacD onald, CPA G roup’s Plan Would Standardize theAccounting for Software Expenses, Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 1996, at B2 (reportingestimate that off-the-shelf software purchases, which stood at $47.9  million, willgrow to $79 billion in 2000). 136 See, e .g., Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991)(holding that Article 2 does apply to software); Sys. Design and Mgmt. Info., Inc.v. Kan. City Post Office Employees Credit Union, 788 P.2d 878, 882 (Kan. Ct.App. 1990) (holding that software is a good and is subject to the U.C.C.); USMCorp. v. Arthur D. Little Sys., Inc., 546 N.E.2d 888, 894 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989)(holding that contract dealing with turnkey computer system was subject to Article2). 137 See U.C.C. § 2-102 (2002) (“Unless the context otherwise requires, thisArticle applies to transactions in goods....”). 
addressed these sections, but they appear to dispel most questions thatmight arise. Any amendment to Article 2 would be redundant.133 In sum, the growth of electronic commerce over the past decade has notincreased the need to amend Article 2.  On the contrary, it may havedecreased the need.  Many of Article 2’s current provisions addresstraditional methods of making contracts, and the growth of electroniccommerce makes these provisions less relevant now than they were in1991.  Accordingly, any problems they may contain have become lesssignificant.  Although electronic commerce raises new and importantissues, Article 2 does not need to address them because other legislationalready performs that function. III. The Decision To Treat Computer Software Separately Almost no private sales of computer software were taking place whenNCCUSL and the ALI approved the first version of Article 2 in the1950s.134  During the past fifty years, however, sales of computer softwarehave become very important. Business and consumers purchase well over$50 billion in software annually, and the total volume continues to grow.135When disputes have arisen, courts sometimes have had to consider whetherto apply Article 2’s rules to software sales.136 Computer software does not fit comfortably within Article 2 for tworeasons.  First, Article 2 applies to contracts for the sale of goods,137  and
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138 Scholars have long struggled with issues raised by the application of Article2 to computer software. For some early and influential thoughts, see David A.Owen, The Application of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to ComputerContracts, 14 N. Ky. L. Rev. 277 (1987) (describing the various approaches courtsuse to determine whether a transaction in the computer industry is one for goods orservices); Andrew Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article 2 of the UniformCommercial Code Apply, 35 Emory L.J. 853 (1988) (arguing that judicialinterpretation and the tangible and intangible property aspects of software show thatit is a good); Note, Computer Programs as Goods Under the U.C.C., 77 Mich. L.Rev. 1149 (1979) (concluding that contracts for computer program copies aretypically within the scope of the U.C.C.). 139 U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (“’Goods’ means all things (including speciallymanufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contractfor sale....”). 140 See Cardozo v. T rue, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)(definition of goods under U.C.C. includes books). 141 See 1 Hawkland et al., supra note 81, § 2-105:2 (“The exclusion of ‘thingsin action’ and the inclusion of ‘things which are movable’ suggests that Section2-105 limits goods to tangib le personal property.”). 142 See, e .g., Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 675 (3d Cir.1991). 143 See id . The court explained, An analogy can be drawn to a compact disc recording of an orchestralrendition.  The music is produced by the artistry of musicians and in itselfis not a “good ,” but when transferred to a laser-readable disc becomes areadily merchantab le commodity. Similarly, when a professor delivers alecture, it is not a good, but, when transcribed as a book, it becomes a good.Id. at 675. 
the definition of “goods” applies problematically to software. 138 Article 2says that goods include “things which are movable.”*618139  This definitionclearly includes tangible items, like books, even if they contain copyrightedmaterial.140  The definition, however, generally excludes intangibles--likelegal rights or services--because they lack physical properties that wouldmake them movable.141 Sometimes vendors subsume computer software into a physical objectbefore selling it.142  For example, a business might record a program ontoa disk, and then sell the disk. Although the program itself may lack tangiblephysical properties, the disk has them, and the disk therefore clearly is a“thing which is movable.” In this situation, courts have not had difficultydeciding to apply Article 2.143 
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144 See U .C.C. § 2-106(1) (defining a sa le to consist of the “the passing of titlefrom the seller to  the buyer for a price”). 145 See Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply To Software Transactions,38 Duq. L. Rev. 459, 465 (2001) (presenting this difficulty as one reason forconcluding that Article 2 does not apply to software). 146 See Valley Farmers’ Elevator v. Lindsay Bros., 398 N.W.2d 553, 555-56(Minn. 1987) (explaining hybrid transaction in depth). 147 See, e.g., Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 778 F.2d196 , 198 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1121 (1986). 148 See U .C.C. § 2-102. 149 See generally Andrew G. Rodau, The Extension of UCC’s Article 2  to“Hybrid” Software Transactions, Nat’l L.J., June 22, 1987, at 23 (discussing theconfusion over whether computer software is a “good” under Article 2). 
Yet, not all sales of computer software involve the transfer of physicalobjects.  For example, when a person buys a program by downloading itfrom the Internet, the seller does not provide anything tangible to the buyer.Although the buyer may store the program on one of the buyer’s own disks,no title to the disk or to any other tangible item passes from the seller to thebuyer. 144  In this situation, deciding to apply Article 2 becomes much moredifficult.145 *619 Second, even if software falls within the definition of goods, manysoftware sales occur in “hybrid” transactions. A hybrid transaction involvesboth the sale of goods plus the undertaking of other contractualobligations.146  For example, a contractor might agree to sell and install anew window. The sale of the window is a sale of goods, but the promise toperform the service of installation is not.147  Hybrid transactions long havecomplicated application of Article 2 because its scope provision does notaddress them. 148 Sales of computer software often are hybrids because theytypically go beyond merely conveying title to goods from the buyer to theseller for a price.149  Instead, the seller and buyer often agree on some setof terms and conditions for the use of the software. The terms and conditions on the use of software can take two forms.  Insome instances, these terms give the buyer rights that the buyer would notacquire merely by purchasing the software.  For example, if the termsinclude a “site license,” the buyer may copy the software for use throughout
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150 See Lothar Determann & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Don’t Judge a Sale by ItsLicense: Software Transfers Under the First Sale Doctrine in the United States andthe European Community, 36 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1, 101-02 (2001) (describing sitelicenses). 151 See, e.g., Geoscan, Inc. v. Geotrace Techs., Inc., 226 F.3d 387, 392  (5th Cir.2000) (analyzing plaintiff’s claim that business violated copyright by copyingsoftware for numerous computers without proper site license). 152 One important po int of terminology is that, for some reason, the softwareindustry refers to all terms regarding the use of software as “licenses,” whether theyincrease or decrease the rights the buyer ord inarily would have under applicablecopyright and other laws. This usage is both novel and somewhat confusing.Traditionally, when a copyright holder grants a license, the copyright holder givesthe licensee additional rights. But in the sale of software, even restrictions on whatthe buyer could otherwise do with the software are called  licenses. 153 See, e.g., Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc. 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1093(N.D. Cal. 2000) (recognizing that the license restricted  resale of software only toeducational users) . 154 Federal copyright law contains a “first sale” doctrine. Under this doctrine, “asale of a ‘lawfully made’ copy terminates a copyright holder’s authority to interferewith subsequent sales or distribution of that particular copy.” Parfums Givenchy,Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 480  (9th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, thepurchaser of a copyrighted item--like a book, music CD, or computer program--canresell the book without violating the copyright law. The extent to which thecopyright holder may restrict the resale by contract (as opposed to copyright law)remains subject to doubt. 155 Most courts will apply the U .C.C. to a hybrid transaction when the sale ofgoods predominates over aspects of the transaction. See, e.g., Bonebrake v. Cox,499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974); Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370,1374 n.8 (Mass. 1980). 
seller’s office.150  In the absence of this license, federal copyright lawsmight prevent the copying.151 In other instances, the terms included with the sale of the software maylimit the buyer’s rights.152  For example, the terms may say that the buyercannot use the software for commercial purposes or *620 cannot resell thesoftware to certain types of users.153  Sometimes these terms even attemptto restrict what subsequent third-party purchasers of the software can dowith it. Absent these terms, nothing in the federal copyright law wouldprevent the buyer from selling the software.154 The hybrid nature of computer software sales poses a couple of seriousproblems for Article 2.  If the terms and conditions predominate over otheraspects of the contract, then most courts would say that Article 2 should notgovern the transaction at all.155  In addition, even if Article 2 does apply to
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156 See supra Part II. 157 See supra Part II. 158 See Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on U nif. State Laws, Introductions &Adoptions of Uniform Acts, at http:// www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucita.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2002); see also No VotesTaken on Amendments to UCITA; Decisions To Be Made During Conference Call,70 U.S.L.W . 2339 (Dec. 4, 2001) (summarizing some of the reasons that manyconsider UCITA to be too controversial). 159 See Report of UCITA Standby Committee, at http:// www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/UCITA_Dec01_Proposal.htm (Dec. 17, 2001). 160 Under one recently proposed compromise , “Article 2  would  apply to goodsthat included  software as a part of their operation, but would not govern thesoftware itself.” NCCUSL Plans To Present Draft Without Final Approval to ALICouncil in December, 70 U.S.L.W . 2193 (Oct. 2, 2001). The amendments to Article2 approved in August of 2002 do not purport to change the scope of Article 2 otherthan expressly excluding “information” from the definition of goods. See AnnualMeeting Draft 2002, supra note 13, § 2-103(k)(1). 
the transaction, nothing in Article 2 says anything about contractual termsregarding the use of computer software. Its application, accordingly, hasambiguous consequences at best. For these reasons, devising rules for computer software sales was a highpriority when NCCUSL’s initial drafting committee began work on Article2.  As explained above, the committee tentatively embarked on a compli-cated scheme to put this recommendation into effect; they were going totreat the sales portion of the transaction in Article 2, and terms regardingthe use of software in an integrated Article 2B.156 Eventually, however,NCCUSL abandoned this plan, promulgating UCITA instead of amendingthe U.C.C. 157UCITA has not resolved the question of how the law should treat termsregarding the use of computer software.  At this time, only two states--Virginia and Maryland--have adopted UCITA.158  Although *621 NCCUSLis working on revising the Act to give it broader appeal,159  the question ofwhether or how Article 2 might govern persists in the rest of the states.Moreover, UCITA leaves unsettled important questions about the scope ofArticle 2 in hybrid transactions. For example, suppose that a person buysa DVD player that contains a computer chip loaded with software. Doubtremains about the extent to which Article 2 and UCITA would govern thetransaction.160 Yet, even if UCITA has not solved the problem of computer software,the decision to address computer software outside of Article 2 has reduced
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161 See supra Part I.B. 162 See supra Part I.B. 163 See PEB Study Group, supra note 43, at 1872-75. 164 See id.165 See id . at 1872-73. 166 U.C.C. § 2-601 (2002) (“[I]f the goods or the tender of delivery fail in anyrespect to conform to the contract, the buyer may (a) reject the whole; or (b) acceptthe whole; or (c) accept any commercial unit or units and re ject the rest.”). 167 Id. 168 See id . § 2-711 (listing these remedies). 
the need to revise Article 2.  Put another way, a decade ago, the draftersbelieved that they had to amend Article 2 to address issues raised by thesale of computer software.  That is no longer true because of the decisionto deal with these problems in a separate way.  Accordingly, one of themain reasons for revising Article 2 has disappeared. IV. A Decade of Precedent More than a decade has passed since NCCUSL made its decision torevise Article 2 in 1991.161 During this time, numerous precedentsinterpreting Article 2 have accumulated. These precedents have addressedand clarified a large number of ambiguities in Article 2’s provisions.Although they have not eliminated all conflicts among jurisdictions, theyhave improved the situation a great deal. The need to revise Article 2 toaddress problems in its drafting accordingly has diminished over this time.A. Examples of Clarification As explained above, NCCUSL decided to revise Article 2 largely on thebasis of a report prepared by a PEB Study Group.162  A significant portionof this report focused on problems with Article 2’s drafting.*622   163 ThePEB Study Group identified a number of sections that were causingconfusion in the courts. 164Even without amendments to Article 2, judicial decisions during thepast decade have ameliorated many of the problems identified by the PEBStudy Group.  A few examples illustrate this point.  One of the firstrecommendations in the PEB Study Group’s report concerned section2-601,165  which states the so-called “perfect tender rule.”166  Under section2-601, a buyer may reject tendered goods if they “fail in any respect toconform to the contract.”167  The buyer then may assert against the sellerthe full panoply of remedies made available by Article 2 for breach ofcontract.168 
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169 Id. § 1-203 (“Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation ofgood faith in its performance or enforcement.”). 170 See 2 W illiam D. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series § 2-601:3(2002) (describing good  faith limitations on § 2-601). 171 U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b). 172 See PEB Study Group, supra note 43, at 1877. 173 See id . at 1873 (“At a minimum, § 2-601 should be revised to state thatrejection is limited  by the duty of good faith.”). 
Section 2-601, at first glance, may appear to state a rather extreme rule.Its text would seem to allow a buyer to reject goods even if they deviatefrom the contract in the most minor ways.  The drafters of the U.C.C.,however, did not intend to give buyers unlimited power to reject goodsbecause of defects.  On the contrary, in section 1-203, they specified thatevery contract within the scope of the entire U.C.C. contains an implied“obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.”169Accordingly, when exercising the right to reject goods under section 2-601,a buyer must act in good faith even though section 2-601 does not itselfexpressly state a requirement of good faith.170  If a buyer is a merchant, therequirement of good faith means that the buyer must act honestly and mustobserve “reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”171These standards of fair dealing may preclude rejections based on trivialdefects. The PEB Study Group worried that the general implied obligation ofgood faith in section 1-203 might go overlooked.172  In other words, buyersmight act in bad faith, and courts might not see the problem. Accordingly,the PEB Study Group suggested amending section 2-601 to make clear thata buyer had to act in good faith when *623 deciding whether to rejectgoods.173  Although the PEB Study Group’s report did not specify how tomake the change, an amendment simply could insert words directly intosection 2-601 saying that rejection may occur “subject to the requirementgood faith.” Although this amendment would not change the law (givensection 1-203’s present general duty of good faith), it would bring clarityto the law. In the past decade, potential confusion over section 2-601 has dimin-ished because precedent has clarified that the requirement of good faithlimits the buyer’s ability to reject.  Indeed, a number of courts have appliedsection 2-601, and all of their opinions correctly recognize the duty of good
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174 See, e.g., Bellsouth Telesensor v. Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. , No.CA-90-1553-S, 1995 W L 520978, at *8 (4th Cir. Sept. 5, 1995); Subaru Distrib .Corp. v. Subaru of America, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 5566 (CM), 2002 WL 413808, at *8,*37 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2002); In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co., 156 B.R. 922,926 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Figueroa v. Kit-San Co., 845 P.2d 567, 577 (Idaho Ct. App.1992); Y & N  Furniture, Inc. v. Nwabuoku 734 N.Y.S.2d 382, 385  (N.Y . Civ. Ct.2001); Domanik Sales Co., Inc. v. Paulaner-North America Corp., No. 00-0669,2000 W L 1855144, at *1 (W is. Ct. App. Dec. 20 , 2000). 175 See Annual Meeting 2002  Draft, supra note 13, § 2-601. 176 See U .C.C. § 2-201. 177 Id. § 2-201(1). 178 See 1 Hawkland et al., supra note 81, § 2-201:8 (discussing whetherpromissory or equitable estoppel may provide an exception). 179 See PEB Study Group, supra note 43, at 1874. 180 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139(1) (1981) (“A promise whichthe promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the partof the promisee or a third person and which does induce the action or forbearanceis enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided onlyby enforcement of the promise.”); Gregory E . Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement(Second) of Contracts and the Modern Development of Contract Law, 66 Geo.Wash. L. Rev. 508, 523-25 (1998) (discussing acceptance of section 139 amongdifferent jurisdictions). 
faith imposed by section 1-203. 174 Accordingly, even if some misunder-standing of the issue persists, the need to amend section section 2-601 haswaned. Indeed, the drafting committee in its most recent draft apparentlydid not see a continuing need to alter section 2-601 to specify a requirementof good faith.175 A second example concerns the statute of frauds in section 2-201.176Section 2-201, as discussed at length above, generally makes promises tobuy or sell goods for a price of $500 or more unenforceable “unless thereis some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has beenmade.”177  One longstanding issue under section 2-201 is whether a partywho has detrimentally relied on a promise may overcome the requirementof writing under a theory of promissory estoppel.178  The PEB Study Groupsuggested in its report that a revision of Article 2 should address the issueof reliance under section 2-201.179 Two competing considerations complicate this issue.  On one hand,many courts have allowed parties to overcome other statutes of *624 fraudsusing promissory estoppel.180  On the other hand, section 2-201 lists severalexceptions to its writing requirement, but does not say anything about
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181 See 1 Hawkland et al., supra note 81, § 2-201:8 (“Given the liberalizing forceof the rules of Section 2-201(2) and (3), it is somewhat difficult to imaginesituations where additional relief should  be given by way of estoppel.” (footnoteomitted)). 182 See, e.g., Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co., 635 P.2d 103, 103, 107 (W ash.1981) (rejecting promissory estoppel in a case involving section 2-201 of theU.C.C.). 183 See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 184 See Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 249 Cal. Rptr. 872, 878 (Ct.App. 1988) (listing cases conflicting on the issue and noting that the majorityrecognize reliance as an exception). 185 See Christopher M . Bellomy, Estoppel and Section 2-201 of the UniformCommercial Code, 100 Com. L.J. 536 (1995) (identifying different approaches). 186 See Annual Meeting 2002  Draft, supra note 13, § 2-201. 187 U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (2002) (“A definite and seasonable expression ofacceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operatesas an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from thoseoffered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assentto the additional or d ifferent terms.”). 188 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 59 (1981) (“A reply to an offerwhich purports to accept it but is conditional on the offeror’s assent to termsadditional to or different from those offered is not an acceptance but is a coun-ter-offer.”). 
reliance.181  This omission may suggest that the drafters of Article 2specifically rejected the promissory estoppel theory.182 At the time the Study Group made its recommendation that a revisionshould address reliance,183  great uncertainty surrounded this issue. Somecourts were willing to enforce promises based on reliance, others were not,and still other courts had not reached the issue.184  The problem, for thisreason, called for legislative attention. During the past ten years, the rift among jurisdictions has not disap-peared.  Yet, uncertainty about the issue largely has diminished.  Throughnumerous decisions, previously undecided states have reached oneconclusion or another. 185  Although the problem of non-uniformity amongjurisdictions remains, the need to amend the statute to bring about clarityhas waned. The amendments NCCUSL approved in August 2002, perhapsfor this reason, do not address reliance.186 A third example concerns the infamous section 2-207,187  a provisionthat alters the common law’s “mirror-image rule.” The mirror-image rulesays that a purported acceptance of an offer that has different or additionalterms is not an acceptance but is in reality a counter-*625 offer.188  Section
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189 U.C.C. § 2-207(1). 190 453  F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972). 191 297  F.2d 497  (1st Cir. 1962). 192 See PEB Study Group, supra note 43, at 1874 (noting that “application of §2-207 has generated confusion in the courts, excessive litigation, and continuingcriticism from the commentators”). 193 See, e .g., Frank M. Booth, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 754 F. Supp. 1441,1447 (E.D. Cal. 1991); Polyclad Laminates, Inc. v. VITS M aschinenbau GmbH,749 F. Supp. 342, 344 (D.N.H. 1990); St. Charles Cable TV, Inc. v. EagleComtronics, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 820, 828 (S.D .N.Y. 1988). 194 See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp . 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan.2000); Gardner Zemke Co. v. Dunham Bush, Inc., 850 P.2d 319, 323-24 (N.M.1993); Stanley-Bostitch, Inc. v. Regenerative Envtl. Equip. Co., Inc., 697 A.2d 323,327-28 (R .I. 1997). 195 See Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors, Inc., 110 F .3d 184 (1st Cir. 1997). 
2-207(1) strives to create a major exception to this rule for contractsconcerning the sale of goods. The section says that a purported acceptanceis an acceptance even if it states additional or different terms, “unlessacceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional ordifferent terms.”189 Courts have had difficulty applying section 2-207 because it contains anumber of ambiguities.  For example, at the time that the PEB Study Groupwrote its report, jurisdictions disagreed about what the offeree must say tomake acceptance “expressly conditional” under section 2-207(1). In theleading case of Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp.,190  one court held thatthe conditional nature of the acceptance must be so clearly expressed thatthe offeror has notice that the offeree is unwilling to proceed with thetransaction unless the additional or different terms are included in thecontract. In contrast, in the famous decision of Roto -Lith Ltd. v. F.P.Bartlett & Co., Inc.,191  another court held that merely including a termmaterially altering the offer amounts to a conditional acceptance. The PEBStudy Group believed that section 2-207(1) required revision to address thiskind of problem.192 Two important developments have occurred in the past ten years inrelation to this particular issue.  First, over a dozen cases have consideredthe question, and they all have accepted the Dorton view and rejected theRoto -Lith approach.193  Many of these decisions expressly describe thesplit between Roto -Lith and Dorton, indicating that the courts thoughtcarefully about the question.194  Second, the First Circuit has decided tooverrule its decision in Roto-Lith.195  Accordingly, *626 the need to reviseArticle 2 to address this problem largely has disappeared. The amendments
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196 The draft, which moves section 2-207(1) to section 2-206(3), would eliminatethe “unless” clause. See Annual Meeting 2002 Draft, supra note 13, §  2-206(4). Thedrafters evidently believe that an acceptance that falls within the high standardimposed by the Dorton case would not amount to a purported acceptance. SeeAnnual Meeting 2001  Draft, supra note 124, § 2-206 p relim. cmt. 2. The commentstates, The “unless” clause that appeared at the end of the sentence that is nowsubsection (3) when that sentence was a part of original Section 2-207(1)has been omitted as unnecessary. Subsection (3) rejects the mirror imagerule, but any responsive record  must still be fairly regarded as an “accep-tance” and not as a proposal for such a different transaction that it should beconstrued to be a rejection of the offer. Id. 197 Section 2-207(2) addresses additional terms, but not different terms. SeeU.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2002) (“The additional terms are to be construed as proposalsfor addition to  the contract.”). 198 See Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569 , 1579-80 (10th Cir.1984) (discussing three different approaches to this issue). 199 See, e .g., Superior Boiler Works, Inc. v. R.J. Sanders, Inc., 711 A.2d 628,635 (R.I. 1998) (discussing the battle of the forms approaches taken by variouscourts and adopting the “knock-out rule” as Rhode Island’s approach). 200 The latest draft would resolve this ambiguity. See Annual Meeting 2002Draft, supra note 13, § 2-207. 
NCCUSL approved in August 2002 modify section 2-207, but wouldpreserve this result.196 B. Limitations of Precedent The foregoing discussion has shown how precedent has amelioratedsome of the problems identified by the PEB Study Group when it recom-mended revising Article 2.  Judicial decisions have addressed not just thesethree problems, but many, many other issues under Article 2.  Yet,precedents do have at least three important limitations that deservemention. First, precedents over the past ten years have not clarified all issuesunder Article 2.  For example, another battle of the forms issue is whetherdifferent terms in a proposed offer become part of the contract created bysection 2-207(1).  Article 2 provides no express answer.197  At the timeNCCUSL decided to revise Article 2, courts had expressed three differentviews on the subject.198  Since then, however, only a few cases squarelyhave confronted the question.199  The topic, like many others, remainssubject to doubt.200 
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201 See id . § 2-201(1) (proposing the change for inflation). 202 See PEB Study Group, supra note 43, at 1872-75 (recommending numeroussubstantive changes).
Second, amending the statute would insure uniformity among the statesin a way that judicial precedents cannot reasonably be expected to do.  Forinstance, even if a dozen new cases address the effect of reliance on thestatute of frauds in section 2-201(1), these *627 cases might not all reachthe same conclusions on every point. The law, moreover, would remainunsettled in jurisdictions that have not addressed the issue. Third, although judicial precedents can clarify ambiguities, they cannotmake necessary substantive changes to the law.  For example, throughoutthe revision process, the two drafting committees have sought to raise thethreshold price for the statute of frauds from $500 to $5000 to reflectinflation since the 1950s.201  Courts have not felt free to make this type ofchange. The PEB Study Group wanted the drafting committee to makenumerous revisions of this kind.202  These three limitations suggest thatsome need for amendment still may remain, but do not negate the observa-tion that the need to revise Article 2 has diminished. Conclusion This Article has not attempted to argue that NCCUSL erred in decidingto revise U.C.C. Article 2 in 1991.  The statute plainly had a number ofproblems.  Skillful drafting and substantive changes clearly could haveimproved the law in some places. The Article also has not attempted to criticize the choices that thedrafting committees have made during the decade-long revision process.The committees have come up with many good ideas.  Even if some did notmake it into the draft revision approved in August 2002, the law has benefitted from their work. Furthermore, this Article has not claimed that Article 2 no longer needsrevision.  On the contrary, as indicated in several places, numerousproblems still remain.  For example, precedents have addressed only someof the issues that concerned the drafters a decade ago.  Moreover, thetreatment of computer software remains a difficult subject. This Article, however, has sought to demonstrate that, for a variety ofreasons, the need to revise Article 2 has diminished over the past decade.This observation should provide some comfort to both those who supportedrevision and those who opposed it.  Supporters of revision can take solace
WANING IMPO RTAN CE O F REVISIONS TO U.C.C. ARTICLE 2 37in knowing that their inability to achieve comprehensive modernizationultimately may not have had serious consequences.  Opponents of revisionmay see this diminishing need as a further argument for their view. *628 This demonstration that the urgency of revising Article 2 haswaned also may have implications when state legislatures decide whetherto enact the amendments that NCCUSL finally has approved. Theseamendments are not very controversial. Yet, as this Article has shown, theyalso are not tremendously urgent.
